We define polarization as the existence of at least two populations in social contact with each other, each of whom claim to have authority and who disagree with each other. Affective polarization takes it a step further when groups not only disagree but dislike each other (Iyengar et al. 2019). Societies have long had polarization around such cleavages of authority, but the nature of these cleavages can differ. Groups divided by a political cleavage, for instance, may be polarized, but their claims to authority often rest on similar grounds, such as claims about economic benefit or social values. In the United States, polarization is increasing particularly in terms of religion and politics, which often go hand-and-hand with each other (Perry 2022). More recently, researchers have begun to consider the intersection between political, religious, and science polarization with a focus on affective polarization toward scientists (Cofnas et al. 2018; Noy and O'Brien 2016). This research focuses on questions of trust, that is, trust in scientists and particular scientific topics, rather than questions of truth--is science the best or only way to attain truth (Scheitle, Corcoran, and DiGregorio 2025).

Questions of truth allow for authority cleavages divided in more fundamental ways, in that they cannot agree on what counts as true or even how to come to an agreement about what is true. We call this an epistemological cleavage. An example of such an epistemological cleavage exists between those claiming that science alone (i.e., scientism)--can provide knowledge, meaning, and values, and those who claim that religion--specifically one and only one religion--can provide knowledge, meaning, and values (Scheitle, Corcoran, and DiGregorio 2025). Similarly, polarization between two groups claiming opposing and exclusive theological realities can also be seen as an epistemological cleavage, as both make opposing claims to truth with no potential for negotiation. Polarization in this case can be thought of as a result of epistemological arrogance, or a division driven by two or more sides assuming that their method of obtaining truth is the only valid source. The counter or antithesis of epistemological arrogance is epistemological humility, or a worldview that acknowledges and even engages with the potential of multiple sources of truth.

Epistemological humility is a type of intellectual humility--the recognition of the limitations of one's own knowledge and willingness to acknowledge the fallibility of one's beliefs and openness to other beliefs (Leary et al. 2017). Intellectual humility has been found to be associated with positive views toward religious outgroups, more religious and political tolerance, increased perception of the compatibility between science and religion, less aggression toward religious outgroups, and less political and religious polarization (Bowes et al. 2020; Bowes and Tasimi 2025; Hodge et al. 2019; Hook et al. 2017; Hopkin et al. 2014; Preston, Hotchin, and Narzeczna 2025; Porter and Schumann 2018; Smith, 2023; Stanley et al., 2020; Von Tongeren et al. 2016). However, this work draws nearly exclusively on US and convenience-based samples (e.g., Prolific, mTurk, and undergraduate students). In Alsheddi's (2020) review of the intellectual humility literature, he notes the reliance on data from the United States as a limitation and the need to use caution when generalizing to other countries. We seek to rectify this, while also extending the types of outgroups beyond political and (non)religious groups to scientists and lay people who are pro-science.

Epistemological humility can come in different forms, but our prior research has identified two important paths that have been neglected by prior research. First, there are individuals who see truth, awe, and beauty in two different forms of epistemological authority. For example, individuals who see value in the contributions of both science and religion demonstrate this form of epistemological humility. Second, there are individuals who see truth, awe, and beauty in two different sources of epistemological authority within the same domain. For instance, individuals who see value in the contributions of both Christianity and Islam (and possibly other religions) demonstrate this form of epistemological humility.

The foundational premise of the project proposed here is simple--the presence of individuals who demonstrate such epistemological humility represents a buffer against polarization and the ability to increase the size or influence of these individuals acts as a mechanism of decreasing polarization. The project will design and field a survey instrument on representative samples of the adult populations in six nations-- the United States, Italy, Germany, India, Turkey, and Japan--in collaboration with the prominent survey firm, Gallup. Gallup is highly experienced in the challenges and nuances of executing scientific cross-national surveys. The selected nations represent hypothesized variation along dimensions of scientism and religious exclusivity which capture the underpinnings of our focal forms of epistemological arrogance. From these data the project will measure overall levels and predictors of epistemological humility and polarization.